The year 2017 marks the 50th anniversary of William J. Baumol's seminal model of 'unbalanced growth', which predicts the so-called 'Growth Disease', i.e., the tendency of aggregate productivity growth to slow down in the process of tertiarisation. In an important contribution published in 2001, however, Nicholas Oulton showed that the shift of resources to the service sector may raise rather than lower aggregate productivity growth if the service industries produce intermediate rather than final products. While Oulton's reasoning is logically consistent, the question arises whether it is also valid from an empirical point of view. We use the 2011 release of EU KLEMS data to determine whether the shift of resources to services has raised or lowered aggregate productivity growth in the G7 countries.
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I. Introduction
Fifty years ago, William J. Baumol published a paper which today is widely regarded as a major contribution to the literature on structural change. Baumol (1967) presents a simple neo-classical two-sector growth model, characterized by 'unbalanced' productivity growth between the two sectors. Productivity growth is higher in the 'progressive' (secondary) sector than in the 'nonprogressive' -or 'stagnant' -(tertiary) sector of the economy, but wages grow more or less at the same rate in both sectors. Therefore, unit costs and also prices rise much faster in the tertiary sector than in the secondary sector. At the same time, demand for certain services, like health care and education for instance, is hardly price-elastic. Hence, even if real production in both sectors develops proportionately, an increasing share of total expenditures will be channelled into stagnant service industries which are mainly financed by taxes and social contributions. This phenomenon is known as the 'Cost Disease'. Moreover, since aggregate productivity growth is a weighted average of the sectoral productivity growth rates, with the weights being the nominal value added shares, the aggregate productivity growth rate will decline over time as the weight of the industries with low productivity growth steadily increases. Nordhaus (2008) calls this the 'Growth Disease.' Assuming full employment along neo-classical lines, Baumol (1967) shows that the progressive sector continuously lays off employees which in turn are absorbed by the stagnant sector.
Eventually, at the margin all employees work in the tertiary sector.
Baumol's model focuses on services provided for the final consumer ('personal services').
Services such as business services, however, are increasingly produced for intermediate use (Wölfl, 2005; De Backer et al., 2015) . Oulton (2001) has called attention to the seemingly paradoxical fact that a shift of economic activity from manufacturing to the production of intermediate services may raise rather than lower aggregate productivity growth even if productivity growth in the intermediate service industries is lower than in manufacturing.
When all services are intermediate services, so the argument runs, manufacturing remains the only industry producing final goods even if workers move to the service sector. Productivity growth in manufacturing does not decline due to this shift. Rather, productivity growth in the intermediate service industries -however small it may be -adds to total factor productivity growth in manufacturing and hence to aggregate productivity growth.
Baumol endorsed Oulton's argument, mentioning in an interview with Alan B. Krueger: "There's a note I got from a young man who works at the Bank of England, Nick Oulton, which points out an important but paradoxical result I overlooked. […] Say that the final product is growing at 10 percent a year, and the productivity in the intermediate good grows at 2 percent a year. As more and more of the labor force goes out of the fast-growing sector into the slow-growing sector, the more the labor force is getting the benefit of both the 2 percent and the 10 percent, as opposed to getting only the 10 percent if it stayed only in the fast-growing sector. So, since Oulton argues that most of the growth of the service sector has been in intermediate goods, then what would appear from the cost disease to be a drag on the economic growth is, in fact, a contributor to economic growth. He's absolutely right." (Krueger, 2001, p. 223) Oulton is clearly right as far as intermediate services are concerned. Of course, some services will always be provided for the final consumer, and for these Baumol's original argument is still valid.
1 Sasaki (2007) (Domar-) weight in the economy must rise over time. Our aim in this paper is to examine whether these two conditions are valid from an empirical point of view. We use the March 2011 release of the EU KLEMS database and focus on the G7 countries.
The paper is structured as follows: The next section outlines Oulton's theorem formally.
Section 3 discusses the database and the methodology for testing Oulton's theorem. Section 4 presents our empirical results and discusses measurement issues. Section 5 concludes. Oulton (2001, pp. 613-18) defines industry i's production function as
where y is real gross output, x is labour input, m is the intermediate input from other industries, and t stands for time. He assumes perfect competition so that, in long-run equilibrium, the value of output is equal to the cost of inputs:
where is the output price , is the wage rate, and is the price for intermediate inputs in industry i. Total factor productivity growth in industry (̂) is equal to real output growth (̂) less the growth of inputs (̂;̂), each weighted by the share of their cost in nominal output:
It is important to note that TFP growth can be defined in terms of gross output (as in equation
3) but also based on value added:
where (̂) denotes growth in value added in industry .
Assuming that the production function is separable, equation (1) can be re-written as:
where
where g( . ) is the value added production function. Differentiating equation (1') with respect to time yields the growth rate of value added as:
Substituting the right-hand side of equation (6) into equation (4), then solving equation (3) for ̂ and substituting this also into equation (4) yields (7) ̂= ( )̂ Equation (7) states that TFP growth in terms of value added equals TFP growth in terms of gross output divided by the share of value added in gross output.
Aggregate productivity growth is the difference between value added growth and the growth of labour input. Aggregate value added growth, in turn, is a weighted average of sectoral value added growth. Likewise, aggregate growth of labour input is a weighted average of the sectoral labour input growth rates. Assuming perfect competition, the weighting factors are identical and equal to the share of aggregate labour input in industry
The aggregate productivity growth rate can eventually be calculated as
Substituting equations (7) and (8) into equation (9) yields (10) ̂= ∑ ( )
=1̂
Aggregate productivity growth is thus a weighted average of sectoral productivity growth.
The weighting factors are given by the ratio of nominal gross output in each industry to 6 nominal aggregate value added (total final demand). 2 These are the so-called Domar weights (Domar, 1961; Hulten, 1978 In terms of methodology, we follow Oulton's (2001, pp. 621-24) approach which involves several steps. The first step is to extract time series data for TFP on a value added basis (TFP_VA) from the EU KLEMS database and to calculate the average growth rate for each industry over a certain period of time. 5 Oulton (2001) These periods typically differ from country to country, ensuring that our results are not dependent on a particular historical episode.
To analyse whether the first condition for Oulton's theorem to hold (i.e., positive TFP growth in intermediate service industries) is fulfilled, the second step involves the conversion of (average) TFP growth based on value added (TFP_VA) into TFP growth based on gross output (TFP_GO). According to equation (7) Oulton's theorem suggests? The next section shows the results of our empirical analysis of that question. <Insert Table 1> The first line of Oulton's calculations). The total effect thus amounts to -0.326 PP.
IV. Results
The column on the right-hand side of Table 2 reports the results for the longest time period for which UK data are available in the EU KLEMS accounts . As compared to the shorter period analysed above, the negative impact of a shift to service industries on TFP growth is further reinforced. One exception is the 'core' business service industry (renting of machinery and equipment and other business services), where the negative impact becomes smaller. In real estate activities, on the other hand, it becomes stronger. 8 <Insert Germany and negative in the US. France stands out in that the shift of resources to service industries has raised aggregate TFP growth, mainly thanks to 'real estate activities' and 'post and telecommunications'. The overall effect of structural change on TFP growth was negative in France as well, however, because two goods-producing industries with high productivity growth -agriculture and manufacturing -lost Domar weight. Germany is the only country where the Domar weight of manufacturing has not declined. This is partly due to the fact that the observation period is the shortest for Germany.
<Insert Tables 4-8>
The overall impact of structural change on TFP growth was negative in all countries. Also, the negative impact accumulates over time. The two countries with the shortest observation periods (Germany and France) display the smallest total impact. Time is not the only factor, however. For instance, Italy, for which the observation period is longer than for Japan and the US, experienced a smaller drop in average TFP growth than these two countries, while the UK witnessed a drop that was more than twice as large as that of Italy over the same period of time.
One important driver of our results is negative TFP growth in business services. In a recent paper, Nicholas Oulton has also examined EU KLEMS data and -in line with our resultsfound TFP growth in the aggregate of market sector industries to be negative in most countries. 9 Oulton, however, does not believe these results to present an accurate picture. In particular, he doubts that TFP growth in business services is actually negative. "Negative TFP growth", he writes, "suggests that firms in these industries are becoming less efficient over time or that technical knowledge is being forgotten, which seems highly implausible in peaceful conditions" (Oulton, 2016, p. 72 ).
Oulton's interpretation of the reasons for negative TPF growth -namely technological regress -is too narrow, however. Timmer et al. (2010) , in what remains the most comprehensive account of the EU KLEMS database and the insights it offers, list several reasons apart from technological regress that might cause TFP growth to become negative.
These include organisational changes, effects from changes in unmeasured inputs (e.g.
R&D)
, deviations from the neo-classical assumption of marginal costs reflecting marginal revenues, changes in returns to scale, reallocations of market shares across firms in each industry, and measurement errors in inputs and outputs (see Timmer et al., 2010, pp. 87-9) .
Oulton focusses on the last-mentioned reason, implicitly dismissing more substantial explanations for negative TFP growth in business services. These include, first, the fact that business services firms -especially in Europe -are often small and probably below the size required for maximum efficiency and, secondly, that competition between them is relatively weak because of "market segmentation and lack of market transparency" (Rubalcaba and Kox, 2007, p. 8) . Fernandez and Palazuelos (2012, p. 245) add that business services "include, among others, a wide range of operations related to maintenance, repair, cleaning, accounting, legal and technical services, as well as personnel training, security, advertising , marketing, and so on.
[…] (A)lmost all of them operate without foreign competition, are organized in relatively small establishments, and are driven toward high labour intensity due to the necessarily direct and personal contact between producers and consumers. […] Consequently, the labour productivity of these activities […] increases only slightly or even decreases."
9 See Oulton (2016), Table 2 , column 6. Oulton (2016) builds on an extended version that subsequently became available as Oulton (2017) .
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Nevertheless, Oulton is right to stress measurement issues. As a matter of fact, output measurement in financial and business services is still poor. Timmer et al. (2010, pp. 92-3) report that 48 percent of European national statistical institutes (NSIs) used inappropriate deflators to derive real output in business services around the year 2000. In financial intermediation the share was 43 percent. Both these shares even exceeded the percentage of NSIs using inappropriate deflators for social and personal services (42 percent), a sector in which adequate deflation is notoriously tricky. Hence, despite the overall conclusion of Timmer et al. (2010, p. 100 ) that output measurement in market services is "fairly accurate", 10 we should test the robustness of our conclusion to possible mismeasurement of TFP growth in financial and business services.
One possibility for such a robustness test is the so-called Corrado-Slifman correction. Like
Oulton (2016), Corrado and Slifman (1999) doubt negative long-run productivity growth. 11 Their proposition is to assume a flat productivity growth instead of a declining one for the industries concerned (see also Hartwig, 2008b) .
Tables 2 and 4-8 reveal that setting TFP growth in 'financial intermediation' and 'renting of machinery and equipment and other business activities' to zero in those cases where the rates are negative -which results in a zero contribution of the respective industries to the change in aggregate TFP growth -does not change our main conclusions, except for Germany. If the strongly negative contribution of 'renting of machinery and equipment and other business activities' is disregarded in Germany, both the aggregate of service industries (NACE codes G-P) and overall structural change (all industries) contribute positively to aggregate TFP growth. In France, the positive contribution of service industries becomes stronger. This positive effect is still not large enough, however, to overcompensate the negative impact of the shift of resources out of goods-producing industries. A similar picture emerges for Italy.
In the US, the UK, and Japan both the aggregate of service industries and overall structural change still contribute negatively to aggregate TFP growth.
10 They quote Hartwig (2008a) in support of this conclusion, who shows that mismeasurement is not responsible for US labour productivity growth outperforming its European counterpart in certain market service industries after 1995.
11 "It seem unlikely that firms with declining long-term productivity would be able to avoid bankruptcy, let alone maintain the rate of return to the owners" (Corrado and Slifman, 1999, p. 330 ).
Oulton (2016) suggests a more far-reaching correction. He sets TFP growth in business services equal to the average market sector TFP growth rate in each country and year. He then uses half of that growth rate as a sensitivity test. 12 In the latter case, the overall effect of structural change on aggregate TFP growth in the market sector remains negative in Italy, Japan, the UK and the US It becomes positive in France and Germany, however. When TFP growth in business services is assumed to be equal to the full market sector growth rate, Japan joins France and Germany in recording a (small) positive effect. What these correction exercises show is that, even if the arguments in favour of small or even negative TFP growth rates in business services discussed above are disregarded, 13 the effect of structural change on aggregate TFP growth remains negative in many countries. The countries in which the effects become positive (Germany and France) are those with the shortest observation periods. Given that the negative impact of structural change seems to accumulate over time, we conclude that poor measurement of TFP growth in business services is unlikely to be the cause behind the apparent persistence of the 'Growth Disease'.
V. Conclusion
Baumol's 'Growth Disease', i.e., the proposition that aggregate productivity growth will decline over time as service industries with low productivity growth receive an ever- There are two conditions for Oulton's theorem to hold, however: Total factor productivity growth in industries producing intermediate services must be positive, and the Domar 12 Oulton (2017) adjusts the TFP growth rate of finance as well, which does not change his conclusions.
13 Byrne et al. (2017) argue that prices for high tech products are mismeasured and that correcting this mismeasurement implies faster TFP growth in high-tech industries and slower TFP growth outside the high-tech sector. If this was the case, then TFP growth in business services might even be upward-biased in EU KLEMS data.
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weights of these industries must increase over time. We tested whether these conditions apply to EU KLEMS data for the G7 countries (without Canada).
Our findings suggest that the second condition is fulfilled. Oulton (2016 Oulton ( , 2017 thinks that negative TFP growth in business services is implausible. We Germany. This implies that aggregate productivity growth slows down in the process of tertiarisation. At the age of 50, the 'Growth Disease' is in good health. 
